The Myth that the Iranian Nuclear Program is Slowing Down

On August 19, the New York Times published a major article entitled: "US Assures Israel that Iran Threat Is Not Imminent." The authors claimed that because Iran had been facing increasing problems with its nuclear program the Obama administration concluded that it would take a year or more for Iran to make the final sprint to a nuclear weapon. According to the article, the critical question was how long it would take the Iranians to convert their supplies of low-enriched uranium to weapons-grade uranium to made a bomb: what has been called by experts, "nuclear breakout."  It was suggested that Iran was having problems with with uranium enrichment, caused by poor centrifuge design, difficulties in obtaining parts, or perhaps sabotage by the West. As a result, the article also concluded that Washington had persuaded Israel that an Iranian nuclear breakout was "unlikely any time soon," though it did not quote a single Israeli official to prove this last point.

There have been a number of public articles in recent months suggesting that Iran's uranium enrichment program was in trouble that did not come from the Obama administration. As background to the debate over the Iranian nuclear program it is important to know some basic essentials.  Uranium is normally found in two forms or isotopes: U-238 and the lighter isotope, U-235. It is only the lighter isotope, U-235, that can undergo nuclear fission and release the energy needed for a nuclear reactor or an atomic bomb. But natural uranium is only 0.7 % U-235 and 99.3 % U-238. Iran has converted its uranium ore into a gas, at a facility in Isfahan, and then injected the uranium gas into centrifuges that spin at high speeds to increase the amount of U-235, at its Natanz enrichment plant. A civilian reactor needs only 3.5% U-235, which is called low-enriched uranium, while for nuclear weapons 90% U-235 is preferable.
 
The question perplexing experts is why the Iranians have slowed down the addition of new centrifuges in Natanz. Iran's known nuclear facilities are monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which uses cameras and make visits to them to get a picture of what is going on. In the May, 2009 report of the IAEA, Iran had already 4,920 operational centrifuges in Natanz enriching uranium. But in the May 2010 report that number dropped to 3,936. In other words, in 2010 Iran appeared to have a thousand less operational centrifuges than in 2009. This led some to conclude that some of the centrifuge machines were breaking down or were not as efficient as previously thought and they had to be repaired or replaced. It would be reasonable to ask how Iran could make a final dash to weapons-grade uranium with faulty centrifuge machines. For example, Gary Samore, President Obama's adviser on nuclear issues, has been quoted as questioning the "technical competence" of the Iranians.

There are multiple explanations for what is transpiring with with Iran's centrifuges, but two facts must be taken into account. First, the overall quantities of low-enriched uranium in Iranian stockpiles is steadily growing. If Iran had 839 kilograms of low-enriched uranium, according to the Jun 2009 IAEA report, it had 2, 427 kilograms in the May 2010 IAEA report. If all Iran requires is 700 to 900 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to produce 15 kilograms of weapons grade uranium for a bomb, then Iran has already enough uranium on hand for two to three nuclear bombs, should it decide to enrich its stock of low-enriched uranium. The US nuclear expert Gary Milhollin estimates that the Iranians will have enough low-enriched uranium for four nuclear bombs by mid-2011.
 
Second, when the West refused to supply 20 % enriched uranium for the Tehran reactor, where the Iranians produce medical isotopes, Iranian nuclear experts went ahead in June 2010 and enriched 3.5 % enriched uranium to 20 % enriched uranium, by themselves. This demonstration of Iran's enrichment capabilities certainly undermines assessments that doubt Teheran's technical competence. With the growth of the quantity and quality of the uranium that Iran possess, it would appear to be premature to say that its uranium enrichment program is in trouble.
 
In any case, counting centrifuges in Natanz is only part of the whole picture of the Iranian nuclear program. In order to make the final sprint to weapons-grade uranium, Iran could shut down the IAEA cameras and prevent inspections at Natanz, but that would create an immediate international crisis. Yet there is a more likely scenario. David Sanger, The New York Times reporter covering the Iranian nuclear program, wrote in his book The Inheritance, that in the classified sections of the 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), there is information about a secret Iranian enrichment program at multiple sites in Iran. In September 2009, Iran informed the IAEA of the existence of the Fordow Enrichment Plant near Qom, whose existence President Obama subsequently confirmed.
 
There have been reports that some US officials link the slow progress in the Iranian nuclear program to the recent mobilization of the international community for additional sanctions against Iran and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 this June, with the backing of the Russians and the Chinese. Historically, however, top US officials also admit that the only time Iran really slowed down its nuclear program was in 2003, when Tehran feared  that Iran was next in line for an American attack after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
 
A UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that was used in the case of Iraq,  could also pose the same threat and get Iran to halt many of its nuclear activities. Chapter VII resolutions are adopted usually in response to an act of aggression or a threat to international peace and security. It therefore contains an implicit threat of the use of force against states that violate its terms. Unfortunately, under Russian influence, UN Security Council Resolution 1929 was only a partial Chapter VII resolution, that was based only on an Article 41 of the UN Charter that authorized only non-military measures if the Iranians failed to comply. In this political environment, the idea that Iran is feeling compelled to slow down its nuclear program is basically wishful thinking.