In the last decade, one of the areas in the peace process where Israeli governments--as well as American administrations--failed was anticipating the "day-after". Those who advised Ariel Sharon to adopt the disengagement from the Gaza Strip probably did not anticipate that after Israel withdrew, the rate of yearly rocket fire by Hamas and other groups on Israel would increase by 500 per cent ( from 179 attacks in 2005 to 946 in 2006).
With the focus created by the Obama administration's disagreements with Israel over the future of Jerusalem, it is important again to consider the question of what will the "day after", should a re-division of Jerusalem be actually considered, in line with some of the thinking today coming out of Washington. Unquestionably, this would dramatically increase the vulnerability of Jewish neighborhoods to attack. And it can be argued on the basis of experience, that this increased vulnerability would undoubtedly be exploited by Palestinian armed groups against the residents of Jerusalem, using everything from automatic rifles to home-made mortars to even simple rockets, just like the ones produced in the Gaza Strip.
The opportunities for exploiting the vulnerability of Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem are multiple. For example, Shuafat is roughly 300 meters from French Hill on one side and 100 meters on the other side from Pisgat Zeev, where 42,000 Israelis live. Tzur Bachar and Jabal Mukabar are right next to East Talpiot, where more than 12,000 Israelis live. Nadav Shragai has noted that Palestinians in Issawiya, which is only 74 meters from the Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus, will be able in the future to take over the domineering terrain controlling the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim road, from the North, and from the neighborhood of At-Tur, in the South, as well.
True, Israel pulled out from the Gaza Strip unilaterally; if it ever withdrew within Jerusalem, that would only happen in the context of a peace agreement. But that argument has only marginal value. It should be remembered that Israel had an interim agreement with the Palestinian Authority prior to the Second Intifada, that Yasser Arafat launched in September 2000. Nonetheless, Jerusalem became a focal point for terrorist attacks at that time. For example, Beit Jalla was under full Palestinian control in 2000. It is positioned right across a ravine from the Southern Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo, where more than 27,000 Israelis live. During the Second Intifada, Palestinian snipers invaded the houses of Palestinian Christians and opened fire on Israeli residents of Gilo, terrorizing thousands.
In short, signed Israeli-Palestinian agreements were breached by Palestinian units. In September 2005, Avi Dichter, who had just left his position as head of the Shin Bet, argued in a Jerusalem lecture that since 2000, the PA had not lived up to a single security agreement with Israel. He specifically mentioned Saeb Erekat and Yasser Abd Rabbo as Palestinian leaders who misled Israeli, Egyptian, and American security officials.
Why must Israel take into account the real possibility that there may be attacks in the future, even after a formal agreement is concluded? First, every agreement with the Palestinians is likely to produce some degree of dissatisfaction, because certain Palestinian goals will not be reached. In western Jerusalem, there are Palestinian claims on many properties. Within the Old City, if an agreement grants Israel sovereignty over the Western Wall, there will be significant Palestinian religious voices who will argue that the area was Waqf property adding the Islamic tradition that Muhammad tied his winged horse, al-Buraq, to the Western Wall before he rose to heaven during his "Night Journey" to Jerusalem. Even today, Jerusalem is a magnet for radical Islamic elements who seek to stone the Western Wall and place holy sites at risk. But without the protection of the State of Israel, these holy sites would become dangerously exposed.
Second, it is also difficult to predict the attitude of a future Palestinian government to Palestinian armed groups. Today, the Dayton Force of Salam Fayyad appears to be functioning well because most of the real security in the West Bank is provided by the IDF. Fayyad has an incentive--he wants to declare a state. But if the IDF is withdrawn, will the Dayton forces fight Hamas or will they collaborate with them? During the Second Intifada, Marwan Barghuti led a special security framework called the "Nationalist and Islamic Forces," which coordinated the military activities of Fatah and Hamas.
In 2000, President Clinton came up with the idea that wherever Jews live in Jerusalem should become Israeli and wherever Arabs live would become part of a Palestinian state. To an outsider, this formula sounds fair, but on the ground it would only lead to a deterioration of security in Jerusalem, and a likely escalation of conflict. You cannot take a city that looks like an ethnic chessboard and grant the red squares one sovereignty and the blacks squares another sovereignty. Israel experimented with its security by pulling out of Gaza; it must not now experiment with its security in its historical capital by accepting the newest proposals for its re-division, surfacing today.
